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Is the scientific realism debate a philosophical “pseudo” problem? 
 
I will be presenting some problems for the scientific realism debate to demonstrate a possible 
reason as to why the question of whether the debate is a philosophical “pseudo” problem has 
been raised so frequently, which will lead to a conclusion as to why this could be a valid 
claim. Problems relating to our language, and as I get into that, I will look into something I 
call subjective truths. The degree to which these interrelating problems make themselves 
noticed could be the symptom of the “disease” so to speak (pseudo), this is my main 
argument. Subjective truths is about how the truth or better yet the conception of any phrased 
argument, theory, statement or anything else can be subjective to individuals because each 
individual is unique and in possession of unique past experiences and knowledge. I will be 
explaining in more detail about this. I will also be using one of the theories within the debate 
to demonstrate the problem with language. Namely the ontic structural realism theory. In 
addition to a few arguments that have been raised throughout the debate and some general 
insight into the nature of the debate to further demonstrate the conclusion. But first we must 
ask ourselves, what is the scientific realism debate and what is a pseudo problem?  
About understanding the debate. (Paul Dicken, 2016, 2) “The contemporary scientific realism 
debate is primarily framed around two competing considerations. On the one hand, the 
success of our scientific theories gives us reasons to suppose that they are approximately true; 
whereas on the other hand, the history of our scientific theories gives us reason to suppose 
that they will eventually turn out to be false.” This quote by Dicken shows us how the debate 
is centred around the problem of how our scientific theories, though successful, are not 
always accurate. The following is a paraphrase of another one of Dicken’s quotes explaining 
in more detail. (Paul Dicken, 2016, 1) Scientific realism states that our scientific theories are 
approximately true. This seems sensible because our scientific theories are successful, but in 
philosophy there is no need to consider common sense. The aim is a meaningful philosophical 
evaluation of our scientific practice and if we suppose that we can have reliable knowledge 
about the external world, the question of the debate is not whether our scientific theories can 
correctly represent reality, but how they’re able to. Given our limitations as human beings and 
as scientists, which I will attempt to outline. The debate asks whether we can believe in the 
unobservable entities described by our theories and whether the success of our theories need 
to be explained. 
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Next is a paraphrase about the word “pseudo” seen in context with the scientific realism 
debate. (Paul Dicken, 2016, 3) It is unique to this debate how often the complaint has been 
raised that this philosophy is nothing more than a confusion over the use of language, a 
misunderstanding of the concept of truth, a failed attempt to stand outside of our own selves, 
bad theories and the like. In this context, “pseudo” could include instances like the use of 
obscure language, useless speculations or people talking past one another.  
Because I’m going to be using the theory called ontic structural realism as an example when 
demonstrating my argument about language within the scientific realism debate, I want to 
begin by looking at mathematics. The reason I want to do that is because math is a different 
kind of language that forms an important part of science that has it’s foundation on a lot of 
structure, and ontic structural realism (as the name implies) also has to do with structure. 
Participants of the scientific realism debate want to figure out whether the success of science 
needs to be explained and it’s interesting (and possibly troubling) that this is a subject that… 
Once you get deep into it, can “talk” about absurd concepts of space, for instance, that don't 
even seem capable of relating to our world. Some aspects of mathematics alone could drive 
people slightly mad just by looking at it, it can also be terribly beautiful in a way that begs to 
be explained and how do we explain these aspects of… reality? Are these dizzying concepts 
of mathematics true within the physical reality as well, and not only in theory? If so, how does 
this correspond with that which we already assume to have knowledge of? How does this 
relate to the scientific realism debate? 
This is an example of questions that can make the scientific realism debate seem like an 
interesting debate even if the participants have not yet come to any agreement and even if 
there is a possibility that they never will. The kind of questions that seem to make people 
inclined to participate in it. Yet, while questions like these may be interesting, the initial 
questions raised by the debate that we have been looking at above, are they the right questions 
to be asking? I will get back to this as I reach the conclusion, but first I will look more closely 
at ontic structural realism and the nature of the debate.  
This is a paraphrase of one of Dicken’s quotes. (Paul Dicken, 2016, 158) Ontic structural 
realism says that the reason why we should only believe what our scientific theories say about 
structure is because structure is the only thing that actually exists – structure is primitive and 
ontologically subsistent – and thus that is all that our scientific theories talk about anyway. 
(Paul Dicken, 2016, 159) “On it’s more radical reading, this is the idea that structure is the 
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only thing that exists, and that there are no such things as objects or individuals in the 
traditional sense at all. Slightly less radical would be the claim that structures are the only 
things that exist, but that objects and individuals can be said to somehow supervene on these 
structures in a derivative manner. The least radical proposal – and the one favoured by most 
ontic structural realists – would be to acknowledge the existence of both structures and 
objects, but to maintain that structures are the more basic and are therefore capable of existing 
independently of these objects.” To interpret this explanation, one must first interpret the 
word “structure” and that’s kind of my point. Ontic structural realism seems to me to tie in 
well with mathematics. Math is a rule-based subject where structures play a significant part. It 
is also possible to argue that structure is the key part in everything else or even, that it is the 
only thing that exists. I think that scientists will have a somewhat different idea about the 
word structure than someone who is unfamiliar with the scientific practice. Because being 
familiar with different things makes us interpret things differently. Most importantly, notice 
how these are all radically different interpretations of one single theory. I could list up more 
examples where interpretations throughout this debate vary, but this one example already 
demonstrates my argument about language which ties in with the concept of subjective truths.  
Let me elaborate on this. Anyone is free to believe anything no matter how wrong it might 
seem and while it is true that science attempts to discover objective truths and that objective 
truths may exist, it does not follow that an objective truth will ever hold true for everyone. Or 
more importantly, that this objective truth will ever be phrased or conceptualized in the same 
way. No matter how much good evidence might make someone feel inclined towards realist 
arguments it is possible that the non-realist will never be happy. That there will always be 
some new way to phrase the same argument, a counter argument or a “what if?” So that even 
if one did possibly discover a final and singular objective truth, it wouldn’t be possible to tell, 
because there would still be people believing in their own subjective truths while making up 
false arguments. That’s only a hypothesis of mine, but this situation of subjective truths seems 
to be like a backdrop that’s following through many philosophical debates, and indeed life in 
general, but complications relating to language and subjective truths seem to be more 
noticeable in debates like this one. Individual interpretations are just that, individual and 
throughout this debate these are so diverse that it seems impossible for either side to convince 
the other.  
Because subjective truths can apply to anything, including our language, this is causing a 
problem as people are talking past one another. Which is a symptom that could suggest that 
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the scientific realism debate is a pseudo problem. Subjective truths and the problems with 
language are two sides of the same coin. Because since we can have different ideas of what’s 
true or false, we can also interpret words, terms, theories, arguments and anything else 
individually. Language is an imperfect tool that leads to conceptual confusion. Humans put 
different things into different words (such as the word structure) because we have lived 
different lives where we have acquired different perceptions relating to everything. Even to 
what we perceive as knowledge or to what we believe through intuition. Which is relevant 
because this debate is focusing on whether we can believe in unobservable entities among 
other questions. 
Here is some more brief insight into the nature of the debate so as to outline it and our 
limitations as humans and as scientists. As seen with another philosophical debate called the 
epistemology debate, we suffer from a handicap because of our own flawed senses as they 
function more or less as a filter that in part is also seen as shield between us and the possible 
reality outside of our own selves. We can choose to believe that we have some knowledge that 
seems more certain (about the world) as seen from our own point of view, but how can we 
have knowledge of how other people perceive it? Any scientific instrument we use in attempt 
to acquire knowledge is also compromised because we built these tools through our senses. 
Even our scientific methods, as they have been developed by us can be viewed as unreliable. 
With all of this as the starting point for the debate, maybe the scientific realism debate is like 
Menon’s paradox?  
The paradox is presented in a Socratic dialogue by the philosopher Plato and the following is 
a short paraphrase of the dialogue. (Plato, 2016, 145-166) In the dialogue Meno wants to 
know whether virtue is teachable, and Socrates explains to Meno that they have to understand 
the meaning of the word virtue before enabling themselves to find an answer to the question. 
There turns out to be no one concrete answer to this however and so, Meno arrives at a 
paradox. If you already know what you’re searching for, why search for it? If you don’t know, 
how will you find it? 
This example is going to tie in with my conclusion at the end. Just like with Meno’s paradox, 
the scientific realism debate doesn’t seem to be moving in any fruitful direction. I will offer 
some reasons for the non-realist to still engage in the debate however and later look at why 
these reasons are lacking. Other philosophical debates are more useful when faced with 
contemporary problems of society, like ethics. Fruitful or not though, we can’t stop people 
from asking questions. That would be like interrupting a child’s growth. Asking questions is 
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the nature of science and being critical is usually a healthy attitude. When looking at the 
scientific realism debate, it speaks well of science if science is figuratively speaking opening 
itself up going "Alright go on and question it, science is all for curiosity." as opposed to 
religion. Where questioning God, for instance, would be intolerable. But this generosity 
doesn’t automatically lead to a conclusion where the scientific realism debate is not a pseudo 
philosophy. Realist or not, placing the scientist on a pedestal is no good because we’re only 
human and humans make mistakes. As mentioned previously, both our scientific methods and 
our tools were made by flawed humans (at least originally) and the non-realist likes to point 
this out. Another one of the problems that the realist is faced with is that many of the more 
general scientific theories that we once held high have later been found to be untrue, but the 
realist can defend both of these arguments.  
(Paul Dicken, 2016, 103) “As our scientific methods improve, we revise our beliefs and come 
to offer better and more accurate descriptions of the world around us. But it is precisely 
because we are offering better and more accurate descriptions of the same things that the 
scientific realist can maintain that there exists a continuity between successful scientific 
theories.” The realist can argue that on the whole we’re still moving forward, that not all 
theories have been refuted and that we carry bits and pieces of old refuted theories with us on 
our journey forwards because they were still pretty good. (Paul Dicken, 2016, 134) “I know 
that what I see through the microscope is veridical because we made [the object in question] 
to be just that way … moreover, we can check the results with any kind of microscope, using 
any of a dozen unrelated physical processes to produce an image. Can we entertain the 
possibility that, all the same, this is some gigantic coincidence?” This argument first presented 
by Ian Hacking is illuminating as to why a realist can trust scientific instruments. Because 
though different microscopes and other instruments were made by flawed human beings the 
information that we gather from these different instruments correspond so well that the realist 
has got to assume that the information is correct.  
What I’m gathering from this is that while science takes a tumble here and there the overall 
progress still appears to be valid and we believe in the unobservable entities of our scientific 
theories by dealing with those situations where mistakes are made by learning from our 
mistakes because the answer to the question of how our scientific theories are successful in 
representing reality lies within the question itself. The scientific realism debate already 
assumes that science is successful and if the aim of the debate is a meaningful philosophical 
evaluation of our scientific practice, we should look at what defines the scientific practice. A 
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major part of what defines the scientific practice is about trial and error. Aiming for 
something by trying different approaches until a successful approach or solution is found. 
This approach of trial and error enables us to investigate something unknown or invisible. It 
seems to be an imperfect, but successful approach because it is founded on trial and error. The 
scientific realism debate on the other hand, doesn’t seem to be a successful approach in 
answering the questions raised by the debate. If you want to know how science works, isn’t 
the more correct question: “What is science?”, as with Meno’s paradox. Expressing different 
interpretations can be effective. If we already knew the answers, we wouldn’t be asking 
questions, but Paul Dicken, the author of “A critical introduction to scientific realism” which 
has been my main source of inspiration suggests that the questions raised by the scientific 
realism debate are simple and I disagree. I believe that the questions themselves, when seen in 
context with what I have presented throughout, might be causing the situation where so many 
are questioning whether the scientific realism debate is a philosophical pseudo problem. 
Indeed, this answer to the questions raised by the scientific realism debate is logical enough 
that it can be phrased through a statistical model, (Ross, Sheldon M, 2019, 141-145) namely 
the Pólya urn model. Best illustrated by the this thought experiment of mine; you’ve got a 
substantial pool of mostly blue and less red balls and you stick your hand in it blindly to pull 
them out one by one. Given a finite number of balls, it follows that you will eventually pull 
out some red balls simply by method of exhaustion. Maybe it will happen straight away, 
maybe it will take some time. Even with an infinite number of balls and an infinite number of 
draws, the same result will apply, given that there are an infinite number of both red and blue 
balls with some set ratio. If, however there are an infinite amount of blue balls, and only finite 
amount of red balls, the ratio, and thus the probability of pulling a red ball drops so low that it 
is counted as zero. The only thing we can know for sure is that this will be the result through 
this approach. (Jay L Devore, Kenneth N Berk, 2012, 147-149) The general proof is a Pólya’s 
Urn model, where the number of drawn red balls given by X follows a binominal distribution. 
Let n be the number of draws, and let p be the probability of drawing a red ball. Then (1-p) is 
the probability of drawing a blue ball. Let the number of draws go to infinity. Then one can 
show that the distribution of X follows a Poisson distribution with parameter m=np. The 
possibility that the universe could be eternal would mean infinite possibilities with infinite 
possibilities for mistakes and we cannot know if the universe is eternal, so we cannot know if 
we can trust in the success of science until we map out everything which is what we are trying 
to do through the scientific method of trial and error. 
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